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This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisis 
from the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standard 
monetary  policy  measures  would  have  failed  because  the  channels  through  which 
monetary  policy  is  implemented  depend  upon  the  well  functioning  of  the  interbank 
market. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed, 
central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted by 
standard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did not 
allow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design new 
channels for liquidity injection.  
 
Introduction 
The  recent  collapse  of  the  banking  and  financial  system  has  raised  fundamental  issues 
regarding  the  fragility  of  financial  markets  its  institutions,  as  well  as  the  regulatory 
framework that intends to preserve its stability. The objective of this paper is to consider the 
key role central banks have had in avoiding a complete financial meltdown. Yet, to do so, 
central banks had to reinvent themselves in their role and modify the conduct of monetary 
policy as well as their lender of last resort responsibilities. We argue that, given the key role 
of liquidity in the development and propagation of the crisis, the classic lender of last resort 
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approach, of lending against good collateral at a penalty rate would have been a dramatic 
mistake. It was necessary to execute a number of “aggressive and creative policy actions” to 
quote Bernanke’s own words (Bernanke, 2009). Indeed, since the beginning of the crisis, we 
have witnessed how central banks have been violating all standard monetary policy rules. 
Yet, by so doing, they have provided banks with a wide access to liquidity and have possibly 
avoided a complete gridlock of the banking industry. From an analytical perspective, there 
are two main questions to be considered when trying to assess central banks intervention. 
First, what is the role of liquidity in the current crisis, and how can monetary policy affect 
financial stability? Second, what theoretical arguments support the unconventional monetary 
policy central banks have followed? The current crisis has revealed both the key role of 
liquidity and the critical role of central banks as liquidity managers. This has turned upside 
down not only the conventional view regarding the separation between monetary policy and 
prudential regulation, but also the conventional wisdom of central banks lending only against 
perfectly safe collateral. We argue that models of asymmetric information and coordination 
help us to understand why the standard instruments of monetary policy would have been 
powerless to cope with the current crisis.  
 
Our paper will be organized as follows: first we will briefly review the major driving forces 
in  the  current  crisis,  focusing  specifically  on  the  liquidity  dimension  of  the  contagion 
mechanisms at work. We will then turn to the behaviour of central banks when confronted 
with this crisis, and summarize the main characteristics of their interventions. In section 3 we 
will review the implications of the theories of the lender of last resort and contrast them with 
the recent central banks’ interventions. 
1. The Crisis Environment  
To begin with, it is convenient to reject the usual view of the crisis as a new type of crisis. Of 
course, we must acknowledge the current crisis is unprecedented in terms of the complexity 
of existing financial instruments, because of its global dimension, and because its epicentre 
was in the US, something that hadn't happen since 1929. However, if we refer to the standard 
definition of a systemic crisis, that is, a crisis threatening the whole banking industry, we are 
bound to acknowledge that it counts with its three classical components:  macroeconomic 
fragility, contagion and a trigger (De Bandt, O. and P.Hartmann, 2002). We will structure our 
discussion  of  the  crisis  by  referring  to  these  three  components,  emphasizing  the  major 
differences  with  previous  crisis,  and,  in  particular,  the  specific  characteristics  of  the   3 
contagion mechanism. We will argue that the liquidity dimension had a tremendous impact in 
amplifying the crisis and, consequently, that monetary policy was of key importance as one 
of the major vehicles downsizing the effect of the liquidity shortage. Although the contagion 
effects have been the more spectacular, complex and noteworthy characteristics of the current 
crisis, in our view the initial driving force comes from the macroeconomic environment and it 
is therefore necessary to consider it first. 
1.1 Macroeconomic Fragility  
 
If we try to point to a unique ultimate cause for the crisis, two main views prevail.  
On the one hand, the diagnosis of the Geneva report
2   is that the main cause lies in market 
dynamics and the amplifying mechanisms that various market innovations had created. As its 
authors put it: “Thus we believe that financial crises are predominantly caused by market 
dynamics,  not  just  by  external  shocks,  though  such  shocks,  e.g.  the  downturn  in  the  US 
housing market in 2006, the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74, the stock market collapse in 
1929, may well have been the trigger” (Brunnermeier et al., p.5). This standpoint is consistent 
with the view that the opacity of financial instruments was the main cause of the crisis, as 
argued by Gorton (2008). Thus the market dynamics view of the crisis considers that ultimate 
causes the role played by financial innovation that led banks to hold opaque assets that at 
some point became “toxic” and made any bank suspect of being insolvent. Once confidence 
in banks solvency vanished, access to liquidity disappeared and the crisis developed in a 
snowball effect. 
The  alternative  view  is  that  the  ultimate  cause  for  the  current  crisis  lies  in  exuberant 
expectations and its effect on asset valuation.  
Real  estate  and  financial  asset  bubbles,  defined  as  upward  deviations  from  an  asset’s 
fundamental value, set the scene for the crisis: when these bubbles burst, this led to the 
collapse  of  the  market  for  all  related  financial  instruments  (Asset  back  securities, 
Collateralized debt obligations…), the increase of uncertainty and the lack of confidence that 
caused the crisis. These bubbles built up partly because of the success of monetary policy in 
channelling liquidity to the markets, keeping inflation at bay and stimulating growth through 
low nominal interest rates. Yet this period of “great moderation”, caused the overvaluation of 
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assets which let to the crisis. Low interest rates and a lax liquidity injection policy, jointly 
with  exuberant  expectations  for  an  ever  increasing  price  of  housing,  led  to  an  excessive 
growth of credit, an actual increase in relative real estate prices and overpriced financial 
assets.  The  low  interest  rates  and  credit  expansion  were  sustainable  because  of  the 
international distribution of savings that was characterized by fundamental imbalances. This 
point  has  been  heavily  emphasized  in  connection  with  the  China’s  trade  balance  surplus 
investment in US financial assets. This recycling of China’s savings in the US resulted in the 
stability  of  the  exchange  rate  between  these  two  countries  that,  in  turn,  facilitated  the 
maintenance of China’s trade balance surplus. 
 
It is my argument that, although the asset valuation perspective on the crisis is much less of 
an intellectual challenge, as it implies that the crisis is not different from all other crises in the 
XXth century, there are three reasons why this traditional view may be a better explanation.  
First, in some countries like Ireland and Spain, that are facing a spectacular banking crisis, 
financial innovations were practically non-existent.  
Second, the opaque financial assets were traded in liquid markets before the crisis, so their 
opacity was inconsequential prior to July 2007. Of course, change of market sentiment as 
self-fulfilled prophecies could explain the switch from investors perceiving these assets as 
safe to their seeing them as “toxic”.   Yet it is suspicious that this occurs precisely when the 
number of loan delinquencies explodes thus making clear the existence of a bubble in real 
estate. 
Third, the decrease in the volume of credit supports bubble bursting hypothesis but is not 
directly related to the market dynamics. This decrease could be the result of either a decrease 
in the demand for credit or a reduction in the supply of credit, as credit standards become 
more lax during an upturn and become stricter at the beginning of a downturn, in such a way 
that  a  strengthening  in  the  lending  standards  precedes  the  actual  downturn  (Lown  and 
Morgan, 2006).  
As it is obvious, in the same way a lax credit policy generates a bubble, it is clear that the end 
of the credit supply expansion and a lower rate of growth for economic activity promotes its 
sudden  burst.  This  effect  is  amplified  by  the  same  factors  that  intensify  it  during  the 
expansionary  phase  of  the  cycle,  as  mentioned,  banks’  herding  behaviour  and  credit 
procyclicality. In addition, the burst of the bubble interacts with the structures that financial 
innovations have imposed in this market, leading to an amplified effect. This means that   5 
instead of the market reacting to under pricing of risk through a price adjustment, it collapses 
because information asymmetries grow above sustainable levels. 
 
1.2 The channels of contagion 
 
As mentioned before, one of the characteristics of the banking industry is that the failure 
of one bank generates a negative externality on the solvency
3 of others. This fragility of 
the banking industry is related to the liquidity insurance function of banks that invest in 
illiquid assets while offering liquid demand deposits. One of the particularities of the 
current crisis is that the channels of contagion at work are different from the classical 
ones, as liquidity played a key role in contagion, not only within the banking industry 
but also by propagating to new types of non-banking institutions, often referred to as 
“shadow  banking”.  Consequently,  we  will  refer  to  contagion  as  the  impact  the 
insolvency or liquidity shortage of one bank has on other banks liquidity and solvency. 
Instead,  we  will  refer  to  amplifying  mechanisms  as  the  processes  through  which  a 
macroeconomic phenomenon affecting the whole banking industry, such as a downturn 
or a decrease in asset prices is intensified. The distinction is indeed minor, and the 
boundaries between the two notions may be blurred, but it allow us to distinguish the 
impact of  a liquidity  and solvency problems in some institutions and the impact of 
macroeconomic and price.     
The Classical Contagion Mechanism 
  The classical view of contagion mechanisms (see Freixas and Rochet, 2007) a 
systemic crisis considers two main contagion channels: contagion through the interbank 
network of reciprocal obligations and contagion through bank runs. 
  In its simplest version the first contagion mechanism implies that bankruptcy of 
bank A can trigger the bankruptcy of bank B because bank B is a large creditor of bank 
A and therefore there is a direct effect of the bankruptcy in generating losses in bank B. 
The  complexities  of  the  network  of  interbank  lending,  that  is  necessary  for  banks’ 
efficient liquidity management, makes the mechanism more complex as each banks is a 
creditor of a number of other banks so that the solvency of each one may depend of the 
solvency of a the others. This interconnected network of banks claims have been well 
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studied and Central banks have simulated the impact of a major bank bankruptcy or 
liquidity default on the other bank’s balance sheet with the reassuring result that the 
potential losses generated by interbank lending (and not on the unforeseen potential risk 
for the interbank market to dry up) had a minor impact (Upper and Worms, 2004). This 
mechanism of direct contagion, based on the direct link through banks claims on each 
other, did not play a major role in the crisis, as quite often large banks were bailed out 
before reaching the bankruptcy stage. It may be argued that the Lehman bankruptcy was 
a major event on contagion, but its direct effect was limited when compared with its 
indirect effect. 
  Bank  runs  are  characteristic  of  the  banking  industry  as  it  results  from  the 
combination  of  illiquid  assets  and  liquid  deposits.  Bank  runs  depend  upon  the 
coordination of depositors and are self-fulfilled prophecies because once a bank run 
start the best option for any depositor is to join the run.  
 
Bank runs constitute a second type of contagion mechanism, already at work 
during the XIXth century. The reason for a bank run is the change in its short term debt 
holders’ perception of the bank solvency, triggered by the financial distress of another 
bank. This may occur either because depositors anticipate other debt holders to run 
(speculative bank run), or because they assume a correlation between the value of the 
assets at the distressed bank and the value of their own bank’s assets (fundamental bank 
run).  
 
In today’s financial environment, the mechanism of bank runs is not triggered by 
retail depositors as in the classical Diamond-Dybvig model, but by wholesale interbank 
depositors and large short-term claimholders. Two different reasons combine for this to 
be the case: first, banks holding a short-term claim on a bank close to financial distress 
not only have the incentives to follow the position of its counterpart but also have a 
better and faster access to relevant information on that bank’s potential default; second, 
the  existence  of  deposit  insurance  limit  the  incentives  of  depositors  to  acquire 
information on the bank and take the decision to withdraw its deposit. The recent case 
of Northern Rock is not an exception: although retail depositors did queue the bank, 
wholesale funding withdraw first, creating the bank’s liquidity shortage. 
Yet, apart from Northern Rock, we did not observe bank runs, and in any case they were 
not a vector of contagion, as Northern Rock was neither the result from nor caused the   7 
bankruptcy of any other bank. Contagion came from the liquidity shortage and its effect 
on investment banks’ solvency as well as on financial markets, with its feed back effect 
on the banking industry liquidity and capital ratios.  
 
Liquidity driven contagion 
 
An asset is liquid if it is possible to make a making a transaction without this transaction 
causing a price change adverse to the trader, whether a buyer or a seller. The liquidity of 
an asset is an endogenous notion as it results from the choices of portfolio managers: 
buying an asset may become risky because agents predict it might be difficult to sell it 
later on. This is why in the present crisis, the illiquidity has gone from the subprime 
assets that were seen as possibly “toxic” to assets with more transparent cash flows (as 
standard  corporate  bonds),  as  their  attractiveness  decreased  and  that  of  cash  and 
Treasury Bills increased.  
 
Two simple mechanisms have been used by theoreticians to explain liquidity contagion, 
one based on a “cash in the market” approach and one that emphasizes “haircut spirals”.  
 
Cash  in  the  market  models  allows  a  simple  understanding  of  the  mechanics  of  a 
liquidity shock and its transmission to the market, as the available liquidity is taken as 
exogenous. Under this assumption, a liquidity shortage will force banks to sell their 
assets. Still, the excess demand of liquidity will imply that the asset prices will drop. 
The argument goes as follows: as banks need have to raise a given amount of liquidity 
from the market, falling prices imply the banks are forced to liquidate more of their 
assets (fire sales). In other words, the banks demand for liquidity generates a backwards 
bending supply curve for securities: the lower the securities prices are, the higher the 
amount of the asset that will be sold and banks will thus be forced to sell at fire sale 
prices. This will continue until the banks themselves reduce their demand for liquidity, 
for instance by reducing their lending, or until the supply of liquidity increases as some 
other source of liquidity (Sovereign funds, mutual funds, pension funds,…) enter, the 
market, attracted by the low level of asset prices. The decrease in the price of assets may 
be considerable, as the demand for liquidity may be quite inelastic. Consequently, this 
will have a dramatic effect on the value of banks assets, and therefore on their solvency.   8 
The important point here is that, although some banks were not affected by liquidity 
shocks, the decrease in asset prices will affect them as well, thus generating a contagion 
effect from some banks liquidity squeeze to the rest of the industry. 
 
The cash in the market model is a highly simplified approximation to the phenomena 
that occurred in the market in 2007 and 2008. Yet, when we consider, in addition, a 
number of more realistic views of the banking industry, we are forced to conclude that 
these  additional  features  tend  to  aggravate  the  contagion  mechanism  from  liquidity 
shortage to price decrease. We now proceed to consider these amplifying mechanisms.  
 
First,  banks  cope  with  liquidity  shocks  not  only  by  selling  securities,  but  also  by 
borrowing unsecured in the interbank market, so the liquidity shortage could have been 
solved by borrowing in the unsecured interbank market. In normal circumstances the 
interbank  market  would  have  allowed  to  cope  with  the  liquidity  shocks.  Still,  the 
existence  of  bubbles  and  the  macroeconomic  fragility  led  to  a  sudden  stop  of  the 
unsecured interbank market for maturities beyond one day. The liquidity drought came 
as  a  surprise,  and  forced  banks  to  sell  their  assets  at  fire  prices.  With  a  level  of 
asymmetric information and a lower risk of dealing with a bank holding “toxic assets” 
would  have  increased  interbank  market  spreads  and  allowed  banks  to  operate  some 
trade-off between the higher cost of interbank market borrowing and the higher cost of 
selling securities. Yet this was not the case and a “no transaction market” equilibrium à 
la Akerlof prevailed. Institutions in search of liquidity had then to fire-sell other assets.  
 
Second, it could be argued that central banks injection of liquidity at the aggregate level, 
through riskless loans could have solved the problem. Yet, the magnitude of financial 
institutions’ liquidity needs exceeded the amount of T-bills they were holding. Injecting 
additional liquidity would have meant for central banks to take risks and buy toxic 
assets,  but  this  would  have  been  a  generalized  bail-out  of  financial  institutions, 
something that was clearly beyond central banks mandate and could only be achieve in 
cooperation with the Treasury. It could be argued that, at least partially, this liquidity 
injection could come from the agents that were demanding liquidity and that are now 
reinvesting it in other parts of the financial system, e.g. if they withdraw their deposits 
but invest in mutual funds those mutual funds will supply liquidity to banks. Yet, again,   9 
the increased solvency risk that makes central banks reluctant to buy toxic assets will 
make mutual funds reluctant to recycle the liquidity they obtain. 
 
Third, contrary to the basic assumption of cash in the market models, the supply of 
liquidity is not exogenously given. Yet, although, ceteris paribus, we expect the demand 
for  securities  to  increase  as  their  prices  decrease,  expectations  and  precautionary 
behaviour  tend  to  reduce  demand  at  any  level  of  prices.  Consider  the  case  of  a 
realization by liquidity providers that the value of the risky assets will fall. This will 
reduce the general demand for these risky assets, causing their price to fall. For those 
institutions that are funded in the wholesale market this will have a dramatic effect. On 
the other hand, the precautionary demand for liquid assets will increase, thus reducing 
the  demand  for  risky  illiquid  securities  as  market  liquidity  deteriorates  and  risks 
increase.  So,  although  potential  liquidity  may  be  plentiful,  liquidity  available  to  be 
invested in the market, which is effective liquidity, is in fact reduced, as the opportunity 
cost of a liquidity shortage increases and it becomes optimal for banks to increase the 
amount of their reserves. This makes more difficult the conduct of monetary policy as 
liquidity  injection  is  confronted  with  a  mechanism  reminiscent  of  the  classical 
Keynesian liquidity trap. 
 
Another amplifying effect comes into play, because, as pointed out by Adrian and Shin 
(2007), investment banks are not passive  actors but will actively manage their risk. 
They observe that when the price of assets increase and banks’ assets grow, investment 
banks tend to increase their leverage. The counterpart of this behaviour is that in a 
downturn when banks’ balance sheets shrink due to a downturn, they de-leverage by 
selling  assets,  what  consequently  increases  the  downwards  pressure  on  the  price  of 
financial assets. The leverage ratio, which financial institutions maintain, is the ratio 
between the investments in risky assets which they make and the equity that they raise, 
and using this ratio as a target is consistent with the type of techniques that financial 
institutions use for their risk management. To keep a targeted level of risk, say using a 
Value at Risk type of risk management rule, a bank suffering a loss has to decrease its 
leverage,  which  implies,  in  turn,  additional  sales  of  assets  and  further  downwards 
pressure  on  prices.  Such  a  decrease  on  the  price  assets  will  reduce  the  value  of 
investments of other financial institutions, and cause them to sell financial assets, which   10 
will lower their price, and reduce the value of the assets held by the first banks in a 
spiralling effect.   
 
This effect will be particularly important for highly leveraged institutions (HLI). Such 
institutions  invest  in  risky  assets,  which  they  finance  by  (i)  raising  equity  and  (ii) 
borrowing  from  elsewhere  (i.e.  by  ‘leveraging’).  They  do  this  leveraging  either  by 
attracting deposits, or, in the case we focus on, by obtaining funds from other financial 
institutions. At any point in time, the value of the equity of these institutions depends on 
the value of the investments in risky assets which they hold minus the value of their 
borrowing. Their leverage ratio then equals the value of these investments relative to the 
value  of  their  equity,  where  the  value  of  that  equity  is  computed  in  the  way  just 
described.  
 
The initial price decrease in asset prices will be magnified through a multiplier effect, 
coming from the HLIs.  This multiplier effect works as follows. Falling asset prices 
force down the value of the HLI’s investments. But since the value of their equity is a 
residual after subtracting their own borrowing from the value of these investments, their 
leverage ratio will rise after the asset prices fall, since the proportional fall in the value 
of their equity is more than proportional to the fall in the value of financial institutions 
which they hold. This means that they will need to contract their balance sheets, by 
selling some of their investments and so reducing their borrowing. They do this in order 
to enable their holdings of investments to fall in with the value of their equity. But such 
sales of risky assets will lead to further reductions in the demand for these risky assets. 
That  will  lead  to  further  falls  in  the  price  of  these  assets.  That  will  cause  further 
contraction in the value of HLI’s balance sheets, further sales of assets by HLIs, further 
falls in asset prices, etc, etc.  
 
It is worth noticing that the decrease in balance sheet of banks implies may imply a 
lower demand for liquidity as the need to finance long term investments is reduced with 
the sale of the asset. Of course, this depends on the structure of long term vs. short term 
funding  of  financial  institutions,  but  the  sale  of  assets  also  contains  an  offsetting, 
stabilising, effect, operating through its effect in reducing the demand for financing by 
HLIs.  
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Finally, the use of mark-to-market accounting rules implies that a decrease in the price 
of an asset immediately leads all banks to acknowledge losses. Even those banks that 
were not affected by liquidity shock will then, in turn, be forced to sell some risky assets 
in order to reduce their capital requirements.  
 
The second mechanism that leads to contagion through liquidity is the margin/haircut 
spiral mechanism (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) that develops in the repo market.
4 
As emphasized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, there is a link between liquidity in the 
repo market and the ability of financial institutions to obtain funds (funding liquidity). 
This  makes  a  liquidity  shortage  propagate  from  the  market  to  the  balance  sheet  of 
financial institutions. To see how the haircut spiral operates, consider the case of a bank 
that  wants  to  finance  ten  year  bonds  by  issuing  a  revolving  one  month  repo, 
corresponding from an economic point of view
5, to a one month loan using the bond as 
collateral. If the portfolio of bonds is initially valued 100 and its haircut is 5, then the 
bank can raise 95 through a repo operation and has to bring in only 5 as equity. If the 
bond is suddenly considered more risky by investors and the haircut increases, say to 
10, the bank will have to raise 5 in additional equity. If this is not possible, as it happens 
during a financial crisis, the bank will have to sell part of the portfolio. By selling 50 it 
will then be able to repo the other 50 and balance its liquidity needs. The same effect 
will occur if the market price of the asset diminishes. Therefore, for those institutions 
that are funded with repo operations, an increase in haircuts and a decrease in prices will 
increasing  the  pressure  on  the  price  of  financial  assets  and  generate,  again,  an 
amplifying mechanism: price decreases trigger the sale of the assets that lead to price 
decreases.  
 
Notice that, contrarily to the classical macroeconomic assumption about the demand for 
money, here interest rates play no role: the liquidity need is independent of interest rate.  
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How important the haircut spiral will be depends upon two features related to financial 
structure: what banks resort to repo operations in wholesale markets and what type of 
securities the banks hold. Both phenomena have combined in the recent crisis to make 
the haircut spiral particularly powerful. 
 
First,  regarding  banking  structures,  there  has  been  a  revolution  in  banking  business 
models. with a switch from the classical lending model of originate-to-hold where the 
loan was kept in the  banks’ asset and finance by the banks’ liability to the originate-to-
distribute business model, where loans are sold to a special purpose vehicle that, itself, 
will sell shares and bonds. This transformation has played a key role in the development 
of the current crisis, as it has led to special purpose vehicles that were not regulated by 
the banking authorities to issue short-term debt backed by the originating banks lines of 
credit. Obviously this created a risk for the originating bank, but under Basle II rules 
this risk did not require as high a capital requirement as under the originate-to-hold 
business model, thus allowing for regulatory arbitrage. Consequently, as banks switched 
from one business model to the other they progressively economized on capital while 
taking more liquidity risk adapted their business model to benefit from the easy access 
to wholesale liquidity that well-functioning financial markets provided. In recent years 
this has led banks as well as “shadow banks” to increase their maturity transformation 
function by creating special purpose vehicles that held securitized loans (long maturity) 
while  financing  them  by  means  of  short  term  repos.  These  strategies  benefited  the 
originator, of course, because of the existence of a spread between the long run and the 
short  run  rate,  but  at  the  cost  of  an  increased  liquidity  risk  that  was  often 
underestimated. It also implied a higher impact of haircut spirals. 
 
Second, the haircut spiral will be more or less noteworthy depending upon the type of 
assets banks hold. If these are government bills, haircuts will be negligible. Instead, if 
risks  affecting  cash  flows  are  sufficiently  high  or  characterized  by  asymmetric 
information  as  it  happened  with  the  CDOs  in  the  current  crisis,  (See  Gorton  and 
Holmstrom, 2008) the haircut spiral will be a key amplifying mechanism, because an 
increase in the risk and asymmetric information of an asset will shorten its liquidity. 
With the popularity of securitization, these securities where often related to subprime 
mortgages and, in any case subject to risk and asymmetric information. As mentioned 
by  Cassola  et  al  (2008),  “The  main  reason  why  general  uncertainty  increased  so   13 
dramatically in the summer of 2007 is the fact that the market realised, first by means of 
losses  in  sub-prime  securitisations,  that  the  current  practices  used  for  valuations  –
primarily the valuation of structured finance – were unreliable. Often this pricing was 
based on ratings and the transaction prices of supposedly similar instruments. The risk 
assessments of rating agencies turned out, however, to be flawed. Moreover, contrary to 
accounting assumptions, for most of these instruments liquid markets with observable 
prices never really existed”. This is how haircut spirals developed with an extremely 
negative impact on prices.  
 
As described, liquidity contagion explains how a liquidity shock in one bank may be 
transmitted  to  the  whole  banking  industry,  mainly  because  of  the  impact  liquidity 
shocks have on the price of financial assets, a contagion mechanism that contrasts with 
the classical ones, whether based on direct contagion or on bank runs. Still, in addition 
to  these  indirect  effects  through  prices,  the  direct  contagion  effects  that  come  from 
reciprocal  obligations  between  bank  and  non-bank  financial  intermediaries  must  be 
acknowledged. 
This  has  led  to  concern  among  regulator  that  has  witnessed  how  the  extent  of  the 
banking risk was beyond the areas of their responsibility.  
 
Indeed,  the  present  crisis  has  shown  that  in  a  well  developed  financial  market  the 
distinction  between  banking  and  financial  markets  is  fictitious.  By  making  use  of 
financial innovations, certain non-bank financial institutions carry out of a number of 
functions traditionally attributed to banks. This has generated a network of reciprocal 
obligations between banks and certain non-bank financial institutions that gave them a 
systemic  character.  The  contagion  effects  of  Lehman  bankruptcy
6  or  the  potential 
contagion effect induced by AIG had originated precisely in the systemic character of 
these institutions, which were taking huge banking risk without being submitted to the 
tighter regulation of commercial banks.   
 
                                                 
6 The spectacular impact of the Lehman bros. default on September 16
th on the money market mutual 
funds shows that the contagion can go even further. The run on money market funds was stopped by the 
Treasury guarantees, but such a run, had it continued, would have impacted not only on the price of liquid 
assets but also on the liquidity of financial institutions that were financed by the issue of short term debt 
and certificates of deposits bought by those funds.   14 
The different contagion and amplifying mechanisms we have described will obviously 
combine in generating fire sales and asset prices decreases. One may wonder whether 
this will spiral out of control, or will be contained. Indeed, if all financial institutions are 
HLI that behave as predicted by Adrian and Shin and Brunnermeier and Pedersen the 
process is unstable and leads to a zero price for financial assets, the financial institutions 
assets reach zero so that they all become bankrupt. This will also be the case if the 
dynamics of expectations formations leads to additional fire sales. Still, this seems as an 
extreme, unrealistic, case, as the value of cash balances in terms of financial assets 
would be infinite. Still, if we define as “unstable” any process that leads to a generalized 
banking crisis (defined by the insolvency of the major financial institutions), and then a 
sufficiently low asset price will generate financial instability. The crucial issue is then 
whether the equilibrium price that assets will obtain in the absence of central banks 
support is sufficiently high for the main financial institutions to remain solvent. If the 
drop in financial asset prices leads to a generalized banking crisis, then the central bank 
intervention may be welfare improving, as shown by Gertler and Karadi (2009) in a 
DSGE framework capturing some of the features of the current crisis.  
1.3. The subprime crisis as a trigger  
 
The role of the third component of a classical systemic crisis, namely the trigger, has in 
this case been played by the subprime crisis. As delinquencies increase in the subprime 
mortgage market, holders of risky assets came to realize that the value of these assets 
would fall. This reduced the general demand for these risky assets, causing their price, 
as well as the price of structured products that included them (ABS, CDOs...) to fall. It 
was this initial effect on the price which was magnified through a multiplier effect, of 
the kind discussed above.  
 
The  subprime  crisis  has  been  the  result  of  an  aggressive  high  risk  lending  policy 
combined  with  the  extensive  use  of  the  “originate  and  distribute”  model.    The 
competitive pressure on the margins of traditional mortgages, led to the search of new, 
less competitive credit markets. Subprime lending was based on credit to borrowers that 
did not meet the usual credit standards and therefore for which competition was not so 
harsh. The expected profitability of lending to these marginal borrowers was based on 
expected further increases in the price of real estate combined with a stable proportion   15 
of non-performing loans. The loans were structured in such a way that they required 
small instalments during the first two years followed by a longer term variable rate loan 
with a high margin.  
The changing macroeconomic conditions combined with the decrease in house prices 
and increased interest rates led to a sharp increase in delinquency on subprime loans 
during 2006 and 2007, particularly for those originated in 2005. Such a change in the 
risk  assessment  of  these  assets  was  a  trigger  because  directly  or  indirectly  through 
CDOs and other securities using the yield of mortgages as the underlying for its cash 
flows  were  held  by  commercial  banks.  The  impossibility  to  know  the  impact  of 
subprime loans on each bank solvency led to a freeze on liquidity, particularly in the 
unsecured interbank market, because of the difficulty to assess counterparty risk.  
2. Unconventional Monetary Policy Operations 
We will now turn to examine how central banks have reacted to the recent turmoil with 
unconventional  interventions.  We  will  argue  that  these  are  unconventional  on  three 
grounds: 
1.  The substantial amount of liquidity injections. 
2.  The interest rate decrease. 
3.  New  channels  for  liquidity  injection  created  or  adapted  with  central  banks 
accepting risky assets as collateral. 
These measures can be understood in light of the amplifying mechanisms of the crisis as 
analysed in the previous section: injecting liquidity at low interest rates decreases the 
selling pressure on financial assets for both the cash in the market and haircut spirals 
mechanisms. Yet, for liquidity to be injected it is necessary to accept as collateral the 
assets  available  in  banks’  balance  sheets,  which  imply  that  central  banks  had  been 
forced to lend not only against safe assets, but also against risky collateral. Finally, the 
collapse of the interbank market implied that the channelling of funds from one market 
to another could be severed with situations where, for instance, primary dealers could be 
liquidity trapped while other major banks had the required liquidity but could not lend it 
because  of  the  temporary  absence  of  an  efficient  interbank  market.  Consequently, 
central banks had to find new refinancing channels for those assets that could not be 
financed in other ways and thus threatened the solvency of some financial institutions.   16 
 
2.1 Liquidity injection 
 
The magnitude of this liquidity injection that has taken place can be measured by the 
spectacular increase of central banks’ balance sheets after the Lehman brother’s crisis, 
with the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England balance sheet doubling in size in a 
few weeks while the ECB and the Swiss National Bank ones were boosted by 30%. (See 
diagram  1)This  impressive  expansion  reflected  different  combination  of  growth  in 
central  banks’  liabilities.  There  was  often  a  rise  in  bank  reserve  balances  with  the 
central  bank,  but  several  central  banks  took  steps  to  manage  their  liabilities  more 
flexibly. Also, several central banks started to issue their own bills (Bank of England, 
Riksbank and Swiss National Banks) and the Federal Reserve started to remunerate 
banks reserves. The corresponding increases in the assets held by central banks were 
different from one central bank to another as their policies were markedly different, as 
we will see hereafter. 
 
 
Diagram 1: Central bank total liabilities 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2009 Q3 
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At the international level, the cooperation among central banks has been particularly 
strong, as witnessed by the simultaneously cut in their interest rates by six major central 
banks on October 8
th 2008. Also, it has allowed coping with the sudden large demand 
for dollars through the expansion of the US Federal Reserve's currency swap lines, as on 
October 13
th 2008, major central banks jointly announced measures to improve liquidity 
in short-term US dollar by agreeing to a $180 billion program of US dollar swap lines 
between the Federal Reserve and the other central banks. In a joint statement, the central 
banks said, "These measures, (…) are designed to improve the liquidity conditions in 
global financial markets. The central banks continue to work together closely and will 
take appropriate steps to address the ongoing pressures."  
 
Both the increase in money injection and the unparalleled levels of cooperation contrast 
with  the  nationalistic  centrifugal  forces  in  the  crisis  of  1929.  While,  according  to 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) the money supply decreased by one third between 1929 
and 1933, the Fed policy has consisted in aggressively increasing the monetary base, 
while  closely  following  the  evolution  of  monetary  aggregates  M2  and  M3  so  as  to 
prevent  major  tensions.  The  international  cooperation  has  limited  the  fluctuation  of 
some of the currencies in major developed countries
7.  
 
2.2 Interest rate setting 
The following diagram shows the main changes on the interest rate that are used as a 
reference for the conduct of monetary policy.  
 
                                                 
7 But notice the spectacular depreciation of the sterling pound and the appreciation of the Japanese Yen.   18 
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Diagram 2 
The magnitude of the interest rate  cuts as well as the frequency of interventions is 
unprecedented. 
The decrease in target interest rate central banks has been a key instrument to limit 
contagion. As usual, a decrease in interest rate is the central banks normal response to a 
business cycle contraction. In so far as the crisis was indicative of a downturn, it was 
therefore a natural move that allowed reducing the impact of the downturn. Yet, the 
decrease in interest rates was here intended to go beyond this classical effect. First, by 
signalling a policy of low interest rates, the central banks intervention made profitable 
both existing and new investment projects by revaluing their net present value. This 
implies  that  all  things  equal  the  price  of  financial  assets  increase,  thus  creating  an 
opposing force to the impact of liquidity shortage on the price of assets. Consequently, 
an  interest  rate  decrease  helps  to  dampen  down  the  contagion  effects  of  liquidity 
shortages. Second, lower interest rates limit the cost for banks to obtain the required 
liquidity from the central bank, so that this does not add to their losses.  
 
Following this policy, the commitment to low interest rate was clearly announced by the 
Federal Reserve on its press release when it stated "that weak economic condition is   19 
likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of federal funds rates for some time" (Minutes 
of the FOMC, December 15
th 16
th 2008).  
 
Central banks also managed the whole array of interest rate by managing the interest 
rates commercial banks obtained on their liquid reserves. In the US, the Fed began to 
pay interest on bank reserves; in Europe, the Bank of England and the ECB narrowed 
the corridor between the rates of lending and deposit facilities, while in the US the Fed 
reduced the spread between the discount window rate and the fed funds rate. 
 
2.3 New channels for liquidity injection 
Traditional monetary policy operates through a unique target rate, mainly the repo rate, 
whose  changes  are  expected  to  be  transmitted  to  the  whole  economy  through  the 
financial system. In this way, by using a unique port of entry central banks can affect 
the whole range of interest rates, as the risk return trade-offs will transmit the interest 
rate  changes  to  other  financial  markets.  In  particular,  the  intertemporal  structure  of 
interest rates, jointly with the expectations created by monetary policy, will transmit 
part of the interest rate changes to the market for longer term debt, and likewise the risk 
structure of interest rates will do so for risky debt.  When confronted with the current 
crisis, liquidity injection through a unique port of entry may fail to provide liquidity to 
the right institutions. This is the case because the crisis is characterized by the freeze of 
the interbank market that constitutes the hub of liquidity redistribution. This explains 
that in the recent central banks’ interventions, we have witnessed, in addition to changes 
in the target interest rate, an impressive number of newly created facilities, so as to 
transmit interest rate changes or to directly affect the different segments of the market 
for liquidity.   
The Federal Reserve has been particularly active in the design of new facilities to 
provide funds to banks and security dealers through the newly created lending facilities. 
Following Bernanke (2009), it is possible to identify three types of instruments: 
 
·  The first set of tools relates to the central bank's role as the lender of last resort 
and  emergency  liquidity  assistance.  It  consists  of  the  Term  Auction  Facility   20 
(TAF)  Term  Securities  Lending  Facility  (TSLF),  the  Primary  Dealer  Credit 
Facility (PDCF) and swap lines. 
The  TAF  offers  term  funding  to  depository  institutions  via  a  bi-weekly 
competitive auction. The TSLF is a term lending facility for primary dealers 
established on March 11
th 2008 that allows primary dealers to obtain a loan of 
Treasury  securities  using  as  collateral  relatively  illiquid  program-eligible 
securities. Finally, the PDCF, announced to the board on March 16
th 2008 allows 
primary dealers to borrow overnight from the Treasury against a broad range of 
collateral. 
 
·  The  second  set  of  policy  tools  is  intended  to  provide  liquidity  directly  to 
borrowers and investors in key credit markets. It consists of the Term Asset-
Backed  Securities  Loan  Facility  (TALF)  Commercial  Paper  Funding  Facility 
(CPFF), Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility  (AMLF) and the Money Market Investment Fund Facility (MMIFF)  
The TALF, announced by the Federal Reserve on November 25
th 2008 is a $200 
billion facility, to extend loans against securitizations backed by consumer and 
small business loans. Also, the support to the mortgage market was implemented 
by means of the specialized agencies, purchases of bonds and mortgage-backed 
securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks, while the purchasing of commercial paper took place through the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), announced on October 7
th 2008. 
The Fed also created two facilities to lend to Money market funds (AMLF, 
announced on September 19th 2008 and MMIFF, announced on October 21
th 
2008) thus helping money market mutual funds to cope with the continuing flow 
of redemptions.  
 
·  The third set of policy tools is aimed to support the functioning of credit markets 
involves the purchase of longer-term securities for the Fed's portfolio. 
In a similar vein, in its effort to improve commercial banks access to liquidity, the ECB 
switched the existing framework for monetary operations in two ways: in mid-October 
2008 the ECB introduced fixed rate tenders with full allotment. This resulted in an 
increase in the availability of bank funding. Banks securitize their portfolio of loans   21 
with  the  unique  objective  of  using  it  as  collateral  in  order  to  obtain  ECB  funding. 
Secondly, the ECB increased the maturity of repo operations while accepting a broader 
range  of  collateral.  The  percentage  of  Government  securities  dropped  to  an 
unprecedented  level  of  44%  of  the  nominal  value  of  securities  on  the  list.  The 
mechanism was already in place before the crisis and the ECB simply accepted a wider 
range of private paper (Trichet 2009).  The combination of these different mechanisms 
implies that, de facto, banks have been granted access to unlimited liquidity at the ECB 
policy interest rate at maturities of up to six months extended to 12 months in July 2009 
(Governing Council decision of May 7
th 2009).   
2.4 Real Sector Interpretation 
Could  the  unconventional  monetary  policy  interventions  be  justified  by  concerns 
regarding the real sector, and, specifically the possibility of a recession? We argue that 
such a justification is implausible. Two arguments can be constructed. First the concern 
about both a recession and deflation will trigger a liquidity injection and a decrease in 
interest rates under standard monetary policy rules. Second, concern about recession 
may have led central banks to promote monetary policy interventions so as to foster 
credit to the real sector. We consider these two arguments hereafter. 
 
First, the conduct of monetary policy during the systemic crisis cannot be put on the 
Procrustean bed of inflation targeting implemented in “normal” times. It has been clear 
from the crisis start that there was a major concern about the real recession and the 
possible deflation. Yet, the aggressive monetary interventions have taken place before 
any information concerning a possible recession was clearly established. Of course it 
could be argued that the impact of the credit recession could have helped monetary 
authorities forecasting significant joint movements of recession and deflation. But the 
idea of conducting inflation targeting without any reference to the changes in the actual 
business  cycle  indicators  seems  quite  farfetched.  In  fact,  the  objective  of  monetary 
policy  injections  was  to  limit  the  impact  of  financial  contagion  and  to  prevent  the 
complete collapse of financial markets. Of course, by so doing, a positive impact on the 
extent  of  recession  and  deflation  is  obtained.  In  addition,  supporting  our  view  of  a 
qualitative change in monetary policy is the fact that, as we have shown in the previous 
section, central banks have been injecting liquidity not just through the usual channels,   22 
but also through new lending mechanisms that provided the institutions with funding for 
a longer maturity and against a broader type of collateral.  
 
Consequently, in our search for a consistent framework for the analysis of monetary 
policy interventions during the systemic crisis, we will discard the standard models of 
monetary  policy  aimed  at  generating  stable  sustainable  long  run  growth  without 
inflation that would have implied a more gradual and moderate approach. 
 
Second, an alternative explanation for the recent central banks’ interventions would be 
to  consider  Trichet’s  (2009)  statement  asserting  that  “Our  primary  concern  was  to 
maintain the availability of credit for households and companies at accessible rates. ».  
Clearly,  the  environment  of  monetary  policy  has  changed,  as  the  transmission 
mechanisms,  either  through  the  participation  of  primary  dealers,  as  in  the  US,  or 
through  the  interbank  market  as  in  the  EU  have  changed.  It  would  therefore  be 
consistent  with  a  “credit  view”  of  monetary  policy  to  follow  closely  the  aggregate 
amount of credit to the economy as the main driving force for central bank liquidity 
injections decisions.  The drawback of this view is that it takes for granted that the 
interest rate cuts and the liquidity injections enforced by the monetary authorities are 
passed through to the final borrowers. It is dubious that banks increased on their supply 
of credit for three reasons: 
First, the spreads and conditions on loans depend upon the business cycle, with banks 
increasing  their  margins  and  their  credit  standards  at  the  beginning  of  a  downturn. 
Second, liquidity shortages may lead banks to invest in more liquid assets that constitute 
a liquidity buffer. Third, commercial banks’ losses have eroded their capital, so that in 
order to satisfy capital requirements they may prefer to invest in low risk assets, such as 
treasury bills, as witnessed in the US credit crunch after the Saving and Loans crisis or 
in  the  South  East  Asian  crisis  in  the  aftermath 1997  crisis.    In  spite  of  these  three 
reasons, a decrease in loan interest rates may occur in loan contracts at variable rate. 
The problem is, nevertheless that it does not affect new loans, but existing ones, and in 
some countries, like the US or France where interest rates are fixed or in countries like 
the UK where interest rates are renegotiated, the decrease in interest rates will combine 
with an increase in bank margins. Consequently, it seems difficult to accept Trichet’s 
point of view and consider the supply and cost of credit to borrowers as the benchmark 
against which we will measure the success of central banks’ interventions. Still, it may   23 
be argued that the final test is in the data: to what extent final borrowers’ interest rate 
have decreased? 
 
To answer the issue of credit availability it is obvious that the demand conditions are 
such that we are entitled to expect a decrease in the supply of credit. We do observe 
negative rates of growth for both consumer and corporate loans. 
 
Diagram 3  
US Monthly rates, 07/2008 to 03/2009 
Diagram 4 
US Monthly Spreads, 07/2008 to 03/2009 
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Regarding  interest  rates,  as  illustrated  in  diagrams  3  and  4  the  data  shows  that  the 
aggressive cutting of target interest rates does not seem to have had a significant impact 
on retail interest rate. Clearly the interest rates decrease has been compensated by an 
increase in the spreads. Of course, it may be argued that the effect has not been seen yet, 
as monetary policy operates with a lag and that absent the expansive monetary policy, 
the increase in borrowers’ interest rates would have had much more pronounced. Still, 
in the absence of additional information, we are bound to think that monetary policy has 
not played a key role in improving the final borrowers’ credit conditions.  
 
Consequently we will consider that the objective of central banks intervention has been 
to preserve the well functioning of the banking system, by operating as lenders of last 
resort,  which  does  not  fully  contradict  Trichet’s  view,  as  it  appears  as  a  necessary 
condition for banks lending, even if the credit supply has decreased.   
 
To summarize, the policy that central banks have followed has consisted in injecting 
liquidity at low interest rates, bypassing the collapsed interbank market and creating 
new  refinancing  facilities.  By  so  doing  central  banks  were  able  to  limit  the  crisis 
liquidity contagion mechanism. We will now show that the theory of the lender of last 
resort provides a sound foundation for the central banks behaviour during the crisis. 
 
 
3. Monetary policy during a crisis, lessons from the theory of 
lender of last resort 
 
The previous two sections considered the complexities of the contagion mechanisms in 
the current crisis and how central bank reacted by implementing a number of measures 
to inject liquidity and to limit the worst effects of the contagion mechanisms. In order to 
assess the logic of central banks’ interventions since the beginning of the crisis we will 
now turn to examine alternative lender of last resort models that could justify it. This 
will therefore be quite a partial and unfair review of the literature on the lender of last   25 
resort that is only justified by the precise objective here pursued, which is to identify the 
role of the lender of last resort in a systemic crisis with the specific liquidity shortages 
characteristic of the current one. We will argue that a forceful lender of last resort policy 
following the lines of the one we have witnessed is fully justified on the basis of the 
conclusion of some recent theoretical lender of last resort.  
We will begin by examining as a benchmark the classical view of the lender of last 
resort in an environment of perfect information and then turn to the more complex issue 
of its implementation. 
 
3.1 The classical theory of the lender of last resort  
The existence of a lender of last resort is directly linked to the functions of banks in the 
economy. If we agree that one of the major roles of banks is to transform long term 
illiquid assets (loans) into short term demand deposits that can be used as means of 
payment, then we have to acknowledge a fundamental fragility of banks: the mismatch 
between its long term assets and its short term liabilities. In normal times, the law of 
large numbers implies that a bank’s independently distributed random liquidity shocks 
partially  cancel  out,  resulting  in  an  aggregate  liquidity  shock  the  bank  can  easily 
manage. Still, when a sufficient number of agents run the bank on the basis of rumours, 
this may provoke the bankruptcy of an otherwise sound bank. The mechanism in place 
to provide liquidity to sound banks facing such a bank run is the lender of last resort 
facility that will prevent the banks’ liquidation for pure liquidity reasons.  
 
As a starting point it is useful to refer to the classical theory of the lender of last resort, 
as  developed  by  Bagehot.  Indeed,  although  the  banking  and  financial  industry  has 
drastically  changed  -in  particular  with  the  introduction  of  fiat  money,  the  payments 
technology and derivatives – Bagehot’s basic recommendation is still up to date as it 
helps positing the role of the lender of last resort. Bagehot stated that the lender of last 
resort should provide liquidity, but only to illiquid solvent institutions at a penalty rate 
and against good collateral. 
The simplest representation of bank runs is the one provided by Diamond and Dybvig in 
a model where agents may coordinate on two different equilibria: either all agents run 
the bank by withdrawing its deposits or they wait, and only the second equilibrium is 
efficient. The paradox is that if a sufficient number of depositors decide to run the bank,   26 
then  it  is  optimal  for  all  depositors  to  run  the  bank.  This  is  so  because  the  banks’ 
commitments  to  pay  depositors  that  withdraw  may  leave  the  bank  with  insufficient 
resources to credibly fulfil its contractual obligations to those depositors that are not 
running the bank. In such a context the Bagehot policy is well defined, as the model 
assumes the bank’s assets are safe, and therefore all banks are solvent and assets are 
“good collateral”.  The lender of last resort policy implies lending generously to any 
bank at the riskless interest rate against its illiquid portfolio of long term investment. 
This comes at no cost because it simply allows agents to coordinate on the efficient 
equilibrium. As a consequence, in such a simplified world the diagnostic of the crisis is 
that a panic situation has developed and the treatment is for the central bank to lend as 
much as required to all banks against the illiquid collateral. Still, when we depart from 
the ideal model, and bring in risky collateral such as “toxic assets” the application of the 
classic doctrine is no longer straightforward. 
  
3.2 Implementing the lender of last resort policy 
In the context of today’s financial markets the interpretation of the classical rules leaves 
much open to interpretation.  
3.2.1 A Macroeconomic lender of last resort 
 
To begin with, in a well developed financial system, the existence of a repo market 
allows access to credit for any institution independently of its own creditworthiness. So, 
if we interpret “good collateral” as collateral used in the market for repos, we have a 
first interpretation of the lender of last resort. This was first put forward by Goodfriend 
and King (1988), who argue that the existence of a fully collateralized repo market 
allows central banks to operate only through the repo market, supplying the required 
aggregate amount of liquidity which is then allocated by the interbank market. This 
view has the advantage of leaving the distinction between illiquid and insolvent banking 
institutions to market participants, so that regulatory authorities do not have to assess 
the solvency of banking institutions in need of funds.  
By injecting liquidity in this way, banks are confronted with market discipline, because 
any doubt on their solvency will deprive them from liquidity and condemn them to 
bankruptcy.  This  eliminates  lame  ducks  (as  in  Chari  Jagganathan,  1988)  and  limits   27 
moral hazard (as in Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). Thus, theoretically, a perfect interbank 
market would result in an efficient banking industry. 
Unfortunately,  there  are  three  weaknesses  with  the  assumptions  implicit  in  this 
argument that becomes particularly disturbing in the context of a systemic crisis.  
·  First, if a generalized panic develops the amount of T-Bills the banks can repo is 
insufficient to stop the bank run. In this context, banks that are liquidity-long 
will  refuse  to  lend  to  liquidity-short  banks  because  if  the  run  continues  the 
borrowing bank will go bankrupt.  
·  Second,  market  discipline  during  a  systemic  crisis  should  be  reconsidered 
because of the existence of contagion externalities. In particular, as mentioned in 
relation to the current crisis, asset liquidation has an impact on the asset prices 
and on asset haircuts which, in turn, lead to banks’ insolvency. This is directly 
related to our previous point, the existence of a panic, as during a panic market 
discipline  simply  vanishes.  Thus,  the  social  cost  of  liquidating  an  institution 
during  a systemic crisis should take into account the fact that banks  are too 
interconnected to fail.  
·  Third, the interbank market that plays a key role in channelling liquidity from 
liquid  institutions  -with  access  to  the  central  bank  liquidity-  to  the  illiquid 
solvent  ones  may  simply  collapse.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  existence  of 
asymmetric information that may lead to higher spreads and, in the end to the 
complete disintegration of the interbank market (A point developed in Freixas 
and Holthausen, 2005 and, more recently in Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen, 
2009).  In  this  case  liquid  efficient  banks  may  go  bankrupt  because  they  are 
throttled in spite of other banks being flooded with liquidity. 
Consequently, injecting liquidity against T-bills at the aggregate level would have been 
unsuccessful to cope with the extent of the systemic crisis that combined a liquidity run, 
inefficient  market  discipline  and  the  collapse  of  the  interbank  market.  This  is 
unfortunate, as intervening at the aggregate level through safe repo operations allows 
the lender of last resort to operate without risk. Once we acknowledge that there are not 
enough safe assets to guarantee the solvency of those banks in need of liquidity we are 
forced to abandon the “T-Bills only” option for the lender of last resort intervention. In 
other  words,  strictly  abiding  by  the  classical  principle  of  lending  to  illiquid  solvent 
banks will be insufficient to solve the crisis.    28 
The implication of this inability to intervene at the macro level through riskless loans is 
that the only feasible intervention has to be through risky operations. This means that  
1.  The accommodation of the classical lender of last resort policy to a systemic 
liquidity crisis context implies lending against risky assets at the aggregate level.  
2.  By  so  doing,  the  lender  of  last  resort  policy  disregards  the  solvency  of  the 
borrowing institution. With some probability this will result in liquidity being 
provided to inefficient banks, the very same lame ducks that we would like to 
eradicate in the long run.  
3.  The concept of “good collateral” has to be defined in a realistic way, providing 
liquidity  without  providing  a  generalized  bail-out  for  the  whole  banking 
industry. 
4.  In order to fine tune the lender of last resort loans, the regulator has to consider 
the cost-benefit analysis of risky lending that will result in the designation of the 
collateral eligible during the crisis.  
5.  As  a  consequence  the  ideal  “emergency  liquidity  assistance”  cannot  be 
distinguished from bank bail-outs.  
6.   So,  the  macroeconomic  lender  of  last  resort  policy  once  adjusted  so  as  to 
provide a sufficient amount of liquidity has to be asset based. By contrast, the 
microeconomic perspective will be institution based.  
 
3.2.2 Microeconomic lending of last resort 
 
In  addition  to  allowing  for  the  forbearance  of  insolvent  institutions,  the 
macroeconomic  approach  may  rely  excessively  on  the  perfect  interbank  market 
assumption. As a consequence, it underestimates the possible network effects of lending 
among  banking  institutions  that  may  be  characterized  by  the  heterogeneity  of 
institutions, (large vs. small, retail vs. wholesale, money centre bank,…) as well as the 
lending  relationships  that  emerge  from  repeated  interactions  that  provides  access  to 
better  information  on  the  counterparty.  This  network  effects  may  be  crucial  in  the 
contagion effects that characterize a systemic crisis.  
Network  effects  are  considered  in  Allen  and  Gale  (2000)  model  where  it  is 
efficient for banks to sign ex ante agreements to insure against individual liquidity risks, 
but this network of contracts may then lead to a domino effect in case of aggregate risk.   29 
A slightly different framework is explored in Freixas et al. (2000), who establish the 
existence of two equilibria,  one of which is an inefficient “gridlock equilibrium”, where 
the interbank market freezes. While in the former set up liquidity injection through open 
market  operation  would  restore  the  efficient  allocation,  in  the  latter  it  would  be 
inefficient.  Indeed,  as  the  interbank  market  connection  collapses,  the  efficient 
intervention is to lend to specific institutions. Namely, the lender of last resort policy 
(which is also a bail-out policy) implies when solvency is observable: 
1.  Lend to all institutions that are solvent 
2.  Liquidate all insolvent institutions but lend to all solvent institutions that 
are connected to the insolvent one. 
Unfortunately,  in  a  more  realistic  framework,  where  banks’  solvency  cannot  be 
observed, the decision would be similar and should be taken on the basis of the expected 
costs and benefits. The key point is here that, in contrast with the macroeconomic view 
that  implies  lending  against  risky  assets,  the  objective  here  is  to  lend  to  specific 
institutions and, in case of liquidation of an institution to provide liquidity to those most 
directly affected in the network. 
 
3.2.3 Introducing asset sales 
 
A natural extension of these models is to consider liquidity triggered fire sales and their 
effect on asset prices, as these play a key role in the contagion process. The issue is here 
to determine the optimal lender of last resort policy regarding asset purchases, direct 
loans and bail-outs, thus taking into account the impact of liquidity on asset prices and, 
consequently, on banks’ solvency.  
Rochet  and  Vives  (2004)  model  the  interbank  market  and  show  that  because  of  a 
coordination issue, the market will lead to the inefficient closure of a fraction of solvent 
banks. The implication is that capital requirement regulation must be complemented 
with lender of last resort interventions 
An alternative view of the joint liquidity/insolvency crisis is developed by Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2006), using a cash-in-the-market type of approach (as developed by Allen 
and Gale, 1994, 1998) where the liquidity available depends upon the profits made by 
surviving banks. Since bank failures imply the liquidation of the assets, the higher the 
number  of  bank  failures,  the  lower  the  asset  prices.  So,  bank  failures  constitute  a   30 
cumulative  phenomenon:  they  depress  the  price  of  banks’  assets  and  this,  in  turn, 
increases the number of bank failures. Optimal lender of last resort interventions have, 
therefore, to take this effect into consideration. Their result is the following: when the 
number of bank failures is low, it is optimal to exert market discipline and the lender of 
last resort should not intervene, but when this number is sufficiently large, the regulator 
should optimally adopt a mixed strategy, and choose to assist a fraction of the banks. By 
so doing, the regulator limits the negative impact banks’ bankruptcies have on liquidity 
and on the asset prices, while she does not commit to provide liquidity assistance to all 
banks  as  this  would  be  excessively  expensive.    So,  as  it  is  quite  intuitive,  the 
introduction of asset prices leads to recommend the purchase of assets by the lender of 
last  resort.  When  the  liquidity  shortage  is  significant,  central  banks  should  inject 
liquidity by buying assets and may have to take losses or even to bail out banks in 
distress. 
 
3.3 Interest rate setting and LOLR 
As  mentioned  before,  lower  interest  rates  allow  limiting  the  drop  in  financial  asset 
prices and, by so doing, slowing down the liquidity/asset prices spirals. Models of joint 
liquidity and solvency shocks as Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2004) and Rochet and 
Vives (2004) show that the lender of last should offer loans at rates lower than the 
market.  
 
For some time, it has been now clearly established that the independence of central 
banks is crucial to achieve a lower level of inflation. It seemed reasonable to think that 
this principle should extend to the possible links with prudential policy. Indeed, this is 
the recommendation of Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) that point out at the conflict 
of interest between a countercyclical monetary policy and a procyclicality prudential 
policy:  as  LOLR,  the  central  bank  may  feel  compelled  to  bail  out  banks  if  this  is 
necessary  to  prevent  a  systemic  crisis
8.  The  empirical  analysis  of  Goodhart  and 
                                                 
8 Note that separation is compatible with information sharing, as Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) 
show that information from bank supervision helps central banks to conduct monetary policy more 
effectively. 
Still, in spite of the recommendations regarding separation of prudential and monetary policies, the recent 
contribution of Ioannidou (2005) shows that, when the behaviour of the three primary US federal 
regulators - the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve Board – is examined, it shows that indicators of monetary   31 
Schoenmaker (1993 and 1995) and Di Giorgio and Di Noia (1999) corroborates this 
point.  
 
The  question  is  therefore  whether  central  banks  should  use  its  monetary  policy 
instruments to cope with a systemic crisis. We have already argued that LOLR models 
showed that central banks should inject liquidity. Should central banks also intervene by 
changing the interest rate target? Several contributions indicate why this may be the 
case, as a systemic crisis may affect the well functioning of the interbank market. The 
interbank market allows banks to cope with their idiosyncratic liquidity shocks provided 
the aggregate supply and demand for liquidity match. Still, in general, the central bank 
will have to intervene to make up for the supply-demand mismatch, as the inelasticity of 
demand and supply will not allow interest rates to adjust so that the market clears. So, 
given  the  inelasticity,  the  central  bank  open  market  interest  rate  will  determine  the 
amount of transfers from liquidity short to liquidity long banks. At the same time, the 
expectations on the central bank intervention and interest rate policy  will affect the 
banks ex ante investment in liquid assets: the higher the interbank market interest rates, 
the higher the amount banks will invest in liquid assets and the lower the need for 
central bank liquidity injection. (See Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009) and Freixas, Martin 
and Skeie (2009))  
 
3.4 Theory and practice of the lender of last resort 
 
The theory of the lender of last resort provides only a partial basis for the practical 
implementation of a specific policy, first, because different models emphasize different 
dimensions of the issue at stake and, second, because these models are necessarily based 
on a number of simplifying assumptions. Still, the different models seem to provide a 
consistent synthetic view of the lender of last resort based on the following principles.  
The lender of last resort facility should allow to: 
·  Lend against collateral to inject the required amount of aggregate liquidity 
·  Purchase assets to avoid an illiquidity/insolvency spiral 
·  Provide loans directly to solvent illiquid institutions if the interbank market is 
not operating properly 
·  If  a  bank  is  liquidated,  provide  liquidity  to  those  banks  that  are  connected 
through the network of interbank loans.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
policy do affect actions of the Federal Reserve Board, while it does not affect those of the FDIC or the 
OCC.  
   32 
Lender of last resort models usually considers only one class of assets. The extension to 
several assets seems, nevertheless a simple exercise in cost-benefit analysis.  
The possible choice of collateral and assets to be purchased would presumably extend in 
the following way: 
·  When confronted with different assets, the central bank will choose as collateral 
those assets that provide the maximum liquidity at the lowest cost (or at the 
lowest risk). 
·  The central bank should buy assets in those markets where fire sales and cash-
in-the-market result in undervalued assets.     
It is interesting to analyse to what extent the central banks behaviour during the current 
crisis has been guided by these broad theoretical principles of the lender of last resort.  
The ECB has lent repo on a short term basis against a wide class of financial assets
9. 
After that date it started to buy covered bonds. By resorting mainly to repo operations, it 
has  followed  what  we  have  referred  to  as  the  macroeconomic  approach.  As  a 
consequence, our assessment of its policy depends on whether we consider its definition 
of “eligible collateral” was too wide or too narrow. The European banks in financial 
distress were not in trouble because of lack of liquidity but because of the quality of the 
assets they held, so that the eligible collateral did not seem to be too narrow. The issue 
was  rather  whether  it  was  too  wide.  Of  course,  anecdotal  evidence  of  Australian 
securitized loans being used as collateral is clearly insufficient, as these assets can be 
held in the portfolio of a bank in the Euro area. One interesting piece of evidence is 
given by the a number of banks (Crédit Agricole, UBS, RBS and Lloyds) that have been 
buying back their subordinated debt that was trading at a discount on par value (28% for 
Crédit Agricole). The banks used their liquidity to buy back its longer term bonds and 
by so doing immediately booked an accounting profit and replace the market discipline 
that originated the discount by the easier short term funding. The question is therefore 
whether it is efficient for the Swiss National Bank, the ECB and the Bank of England to 
finance the restructuring of banks’ liabilities and the replacement of stable long term 
liabilities by short term ones. If central banks are in fact subsidizing commercial banks, 
by providing them with cheaper resources than the ones they would obtain in the market 
this is clearly an inefficient. On the other hand, the alternative, favourable, interpretation 
is simply that central banks are providing liquidity successfully and that these banks 
have all the resources they need to cope with the progressive withdrawal of liquidity 
that  is  to  come,  so  the  operation  simply  demonstrates  how  successful  the  liquidity 
                                                 
9 Until its decision of May 2007
th, it has not bought assets from the banks.   33 
injection by central banks has been. Still, the pure macroeconomic approach may be 
questioned on the basis of this possible implicit generalized funding subsidy.  
 
The Federal Reserve has also resorted to liquidity injection, but its implementation has 
been quite different. First, although the auctioning of “toxic assets” could not in the end 
be implemented, the Fed has resorted to buying assets (although obviously not the toxic 
ones!). Also, it has created special refinancing facilities. So, the Fed approach combines 
the macroeconomic and the network approach to the lender of last resort. It is true that 
the discount window, although available to all banks, has not been a key element in the 
Fed interventions because borrowing from the discount window suffers from a “stigma 
effect”, as banks view their use of the discount window as damaging their reputation. 
Still, different types of financial institutions (primary dealers, mutual funds…) have had 
access to different facilities. By so doing the Federal Reserve has created a substitute to 
the interbank market and taken into account the crucial impact of network effects in the 
contagion phenomenon.      
 
CONCLUSION 
  The overall conclusion is that central banks in developed countries have been 
successful  in  avoiding  the  worst  consequences  of  the  crisis.  By  abandoning  the 
separation  between  prudential  regulation  and  monetary  policy  central  banks  have 
adopted a hand on approach and quickly reacted to the financial institutions’ liquidity 
needs. Have they gone too far in injecting liquidity? The cost benefit analysis clearly 
weights in quite an asymmetric way the cost of the two types of errors. Injecting too 
much liquidity has a limited cost in terms of possible implicit subsidies to the banking 
industry. Injecting an insufficient amount is useless fosters contagion and may lead to 
having  to  inject  even  more  liquidity,  as  illustrated  in  the  Acharya  and  Yorulmazer 
(2006) model. So, the initial move to inject as much liquidity as needed by banks (as 
illustrated in particular by the ECB full allotment procedures) was the right one. The 
cost to taxpayers might be high
10 but clearly lower than the cost of a complete banking 
meltdown.  In  the  future  we  will  see  how  central  banks  progressively  withdraw  the 
                                                 
10 As of today the Treasury has made profits on both its capital injections in Citigroup and its loans to 
financial institutions.   34 
liquidity they have injected and restore their inflation targeting policy. This will be a 
test  for  banking  institutions  resiliency  and  will  mark  the  conclusion  of  the  current 
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